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Auch mit seiner neuen Reihe „IAB-Discussion Paper“ will das Forschungsinstitut der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit den Dialog mit der externen Wissenschaft intensivieren. Durch die rasche Verbreitung von 
Forschungsergebnissen über das Internet soll noch vor Drucklegung Kritik angeregt und Qualität 
gesichert werden. 
 
 
 
Also with its new series "IAB Discussion Paper" the research institute of the German Federal 
Employment Agency wants to intensify dialogue with external science. By the rapid spreading of 
research results via Internet still before printing criticism shall be stimulated a quality shall be 
ensured. 
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Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in Small Establishments 
Thomas K. Bauer, Stefan Bender and Holger Bonin∗ 
Abstract 
Based on a large employer-employee matched data set, the paper investigates the effects of 
variable enforcement of German dismissal protection legislation on the employment dynamics 
in small establishments. Specifically, using a difference-in-differences approach, we study the 
effect of changes in the threshold scale exempting small establishments from dismissal 
protection provisions on worker flows. In contrast to the predictions of the theory, our results 
indicate that there are no statistically significant effects of the dismissal protection legislation 
on worker turnover. 
JEL Classification: J21, J23, J58 
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1 Introduction 
In December 2003, a broad coalition in the German parliament approved a set of reforms 
aimed at reducing the country’s high structural unemployment. One Element of the reforms is 
a change in the coverage of small establishments by the dismissal protection code. 
Specifically, the threshold determining coverage has moved from five to ten workers starting 
in January 2004. The recent amendment followed two previous changes in only a decade. In 
1996, the center-right government under Chancellor Kohl had already raised the exemption 
threshold from five to ten employees; yet the center-left government under Chancellor 
Schröder after winning the general elections rescinded this change in January 1999. 
Similar to Germany, most European countries exempt firms operating below a certain 
threshold scale from employment protection legislation. So far, only few studies have 
empirically analyzed the impact of these thresholds in employment protection legislation on 
the distribution of firm sizes and the hiring and firing behavior of small firms. The lack of 
attention is surprising, since small-sized entities represent a substantial share of all firms and 
total employment. In addition, variable enforcement is a source of within-country variation 
helping to identify the effects of employment protection legislation on employment outcomes 
in general. 
This paper investigates the effects of dismissal protection on small firms using a large 
administrative employer-employee matched data set of West German establishments with less 
than 30 employees. As the rules for exemption from dismissal protection legislation changed 
over the period covered by the data, we identify the impact of dismissal protection legislation 
on employment not only along the establishment size dimension. We also analyze 
employment dynamics of treated establishments before and after the reforms using a 
difference-in-differences approach. 
The paper improves upon previous contributions in several ways. Most importantly, we study 
gross worker flows, i.e. the total number of hirings and separations, while the few available 
estimates of threshold effects based on firm level data are confined to net changes in 
employment stocks. Analysis of worker flows is clearly preferable, since it is closer to the 
propositions offered by economic theory. Secondly, we start from a very large sample of 
employers which in particular does not underrepresent the smallest units. Finally, our data 
refer to the unit of employment for which the exemption threshold scale is actually defined, 
i.e. establishments rather than firms. 
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We present estimates based on a cross-sectional approach indicating threshold effects in line 
with the predictions of basic economic theory. These estimates, however, rely on rather strong 
identification assumptions and are not robust. Estimates based on a difference-in-differences 
approach, which are robust, do not confirm a significant correlation between worker flows and 
the stringency of dismissal protection. This result is in contrast to the previous empirical 
evidence which taken together suggests a small but significantly positive effect of weaker 
dismissal protection on employment dynamics in exempted firms. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section shortly reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature. Section 3 describes the institutions of dismissal protection legislation in Germany 
and discusses our data. Section 4 presents results for cross-sectional and difference-in-
differences estimation strategies. Section 5 concludes by discussing possible reasons why the 
empirical findings do not confirm the theoretical expectations. 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
Like other forms of mandatory employment protection, dismissal protection legislation 
generates non-wage labor costs, unless it is offset by proportionate wage changes through 
efficient labor contracts (Lazear 1990). These costs, interpreted as a resource cost per worker, 
reduce the profitability of firms and therefore output and employment. In addition, there 
might be a substitution effect reducing labor demand depending on the degree of 
substitutability or complementarity to other factors of production. These negative effects 
aggravate if protection of insiders is a source of imposing contracting costs on employers 
(Lindbeck and Snower 1988). However, economic theory also provides arguments in support 
of employment enhancing effects of employment protection legislation. Labor productivity 
might increase due to improved training incentives and better job matches (Mortensen and 
Pissarides 1999). Mandatory dismissal protection may improve the employer-employee 
relationship by providing insurance against unemployment if insurance markets affected by 
moral hazard do not provide sufficient coverage (Pissarides 2001). 
A more specific interpretation of dismissal protection is that as a tax on labor shedding. 
Economic theory then relates to worker flows. The basic prediction is a negative correlation 
between the level of adjustment costs and both hiring and separation rates. During a recession, 
the wedge between the cost of dismissing a worker and the marginal worker’s product leads 
to fewer firings. Firms rather let employment decline via quits. During a boom, the wedge 
between the product of the marginal worker and the present value of costs incurred in case of 
a dismissal later on reduces hirings. If firms are flexible to accommodate shocks by adjusting 
working hours, these effects are intensified (Hamermesh 1988). 
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As hiring and firing incentives work in opposite directions, the impact of mandated 
adjustment costs on employment stocks is theoretically ambiguous. In a partial equilibrium 
framework, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1992) show that the direction of the 
employment effect hinges on the specific functional form of labor demand and the discount 
rate applied to evaluate future firing events. The conclusion of ambiguous average 
employment effects is also prevalent in general equilibrium models (Ljungqvist 2002). 
In summary, though economic theory does not provide a clear-cut hypothesis about the 
impact of more stringent dismissal protection on employment stocks, the predicted effect on 
worker flows is unambiguously negative. The theory of dismissal protection furthermore 
suggests several structural effects. Worker reallocation may slow down more in sectors facing 
relatively volatile demand than in sectors facing relatively stable demand (Alvarez and 
Veracierto 1998). Furthermore, non-uniform enforcement may create a dual labor market: 
firms expand on jobs with less stringent dismissal protection provisions like part-time or fixed-
term work (Saint-Paul 1996). 
More generally, firms may engage in strategic behavior to avoid institutional constraints. If 
exemption is possible on the basis of a threshold scale, larger firms could split into formally 
independent units. Smaller firms could stop growing to elude the institutional constraint 
(Borgarello, Garibaldi, and Pacelli 2003). 
The available empirical evidence for the impact of employment protection legislation on 
employment stocks and flows, surveyed by Addison and Teixeira (2001), does not clearly 
support the theoretical predictions. A vast majority of the empirical literature follows Lazear 
(1990) in exploiting cross-country variation in index values for the stringency of employment 
protection legislation, as created for example by the OECD (1999). The only robust empirical 
finding in this literature is that more stringent employment protection reduces flows into and 
out of unemployment. The results concerning employment flows are ambiguous, while the 
estimated effects on aggregate employment stocks are mostly insignificant. 
An alternative strand of the literature working with macroeconomic data analyzes the impact 
of dismissal protection legislation through estimated parameters for the speed of labor 
adjustment in response to output shocks. In the context of a standard dynamic labor demand 
framework for Germany, Kraft (1993), Abraham and Houseman (1994) and Hunt (2000) do 
not find any evidence that a legal amendment in 1985 aimed at reducing dismissal costs 
fostered employment adjustment. 
The empirical results obtained from aggregated data could be criticized on several grounds. In 
cross-country studies, significant effects mostly arise from the international variation in 
regulations. Because of the limited time-series variation, it is difficult to gauge the impact of 
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specific legislation and hardly possible to correct for the interaction of employment protection 
legislation with other institutional features (Bertola and Rogerson 1997). Single-country 
studies rely on strong identification assumptions to establish a correlation between dismissal 
protection legislation and labor market outcomes: it is difficult to disentangle dismissal costs 
from other costs of adjustment. In any case, there is a possibility of aggregation bias masking 
heterogeneous behavior at the micro level. 
Although it seems preferable to work with appropriately disaggregated data, relatively few 
studies analyze the impact of employment protection legislation at the firm or worker level. 
This literature exploits two types of within-country variation. A first source of identification is 
changes in regulations that constitute quasi-natural experiments. Based on labor market 
reforms in South America, Kugler (2004) and Saavedra and Torero (2004) estimate that lower 
firing costs significantly reduce the duration of individual employment. 
A second source of identification is variable enforcement of regulations. On the one hand, in 
many countries certain groups of workers are better or worse protected against dismissal than 
a reference group. Along this dimension, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) estimate a negative 
impact of specific protection legislation for disabled workers in the United States on the 
hiring probabilities of this group. This identification strategy may yield biased results, 
however, if agents can switch between the flexible and the rigid segment of the workforce. 
On the other hand, typically certain employers are exempted from the most stringent 
provisions for employment protection. Along this dimension, Borgarello, Garibaldi, and 
Pacelli (2003) study the impact of a 15-employee-threshold in the Italian dismissal protection 
legislation on the distribution of firm sizes. Their empirical results support the hypothesis that 
the threshold has a significant but small negative impact on employment growth in exempted 
firms. Additional estimates by Boeri and Jimeno-Serrano (2003) exploring the same data and 
institutional setting do not confirm this finding. Their results rather indicate that firms 
operating below the exemption threshold are more dynamic in the sense of experiencing 
higher job destruction. Both studies take an empirical approach based on the matrix of 
aggregate transition probabilities between firm sizes. Hence ignoring valuable information at 
the disaggregate level, they may not appropriately control for firm heterogeneity. 
Verick (2004) presents some significant evidence that a tightening of the exemption threshold 
through a change in the German dismissal protection legislation was associated with a lower 
probability of employment growth in the treated establishments. However, the underlying 
data drawn from the IAB-Betriebspanel is not representative for the population of small 
establishments in Germany. The study furthermore does not analyze worker flows. 
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3 The Case of Germany 
3.1 Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany 
In Germany, many legal provisions governing the relationship between employers and 
employees depend on firm size. Employment protection legislation in many areas exempts 
small units altogether, or at least allows them to operate under less stringent arrangements. An 
example for the latter is the rules concerning dismissal. Statutory protection against dismissal is 
generally provided under the provisions of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) 
in combination with the Protection Against Dismissal Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz).1 
However, the more stringent constraints on dismissals under the Protection Against Dismissal 
Act (PADA) do not apply to businesses employing less than a certain minimum number of 
workers. 
Several criteria determine if the PADA applies. First, the employer must operate below the 
exemption threshold permanently. Consequently, employees on fixedterm contracts or 
employed for less than six months per year, vocational trainees and certain ‘marginal’ part-
timers with irregular wages do not count in calculating the number of employees in a unit. 
Second, legislation concerns dependent employees, which excludes owners, consultants and 
family members without a labor contract. Third, the threshold scale is based on the concept of 
full-time equivalent employees. Part-time employees are given different weights depending 
on their contractual working hours. Finally, the exemption criteria apply to establishments, 
not firms. An establishment is a production unit at a single location. It can economically or 
legally depend on other establishments building up to a firm. 
These rules apply to all establishments in the public and private sector, with the exception of 
private households being employers. If an establishment operates below the exemption 
threshold, it has the right to dismiss any worker provided that comparatively moderate Civil 
Code standards are met. If it is larger, the restrictions on dismissal under the PADA apply to all 
workers counting for the threshold scale. According to the PADA, an employment 
relationship can only be terminated by way of three exceptions: (i) dismissal on grounds of 
personal incapability or health problems, (ii) dismissal on grounds of bad conduct, and (iii) 
redundancy in which case the employer is obliged to adhere to social selection criteria. If the 
employer could not substantiate one of these three reasons, Labor Courts would generally 
rectify a dismissal for the reason of fairness. 
                                                
1 In addition, collective bargaining agreements or individual employment contracts might include 
provisions for the case of dismissal. Since these are private contracts, they might serve as a means 
to allocate the rents from job stability, and therefore do not have an obvious effect on labor market 
performance. 
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Some systematic guidelines for typical circumstances when dismissal is fair in accordance 
with the PADA have developed in case law. Employers must obey the principle of 
proportionality— dismissal generally is the last resort. This means that termination of the 
employment relationship is not permitted, if less severe remedies are available. In particular, 
training to another job within the establishment or an adjustment of working conditions 
including a wage change are considered reasonable alternatives to dismissal. As it is rather 
difficult for employers to prove that all requirements for legal dismissal are met, a high 
proportion of dismissal cases end in settlements, both in court and out of court. Settlements 
predominantly result in the employment relationship being cancelled in return for severance 
payments. 
Even if the employee wins a dismissal case, there is statutory provision for Labor Courts to 
dissolve the employment relationship and rule a payment of compensation for job loss. 
Essentially, therefore, the German PADA does not operate as a barrier to dismissal but as a 
mechanism securing material compensation for the dismissed. But even in cases where the 
provisions for protection against unfair dismissal do not lead to a severance payment, 
uncertainty about legal positions imposes a latent cost upon establishments under the 
regulations of the PADA. 
Since January 2004, the minimum establishment size for applicability of the PADA is the 
equivalent of ten full-time employees. Before, the exemption threshold scale changed 
repeatedly. First, in October 1996, the center-right government under Chancellor Kohl 
deregulated employment protection by lifting the traditional barrier of five employees. The 
amendment additionally exempted establishments operating with six to ten employees, which 
basically is the recently reinstated policy. The liberalization potentially affected a substantial 
part of the work force. About 30% of all establishments, representing about 75% of all 
employees paying social insurance contributions, were operating under the provisions of the 
PADA when the reform was introduced. The more generous exemption policy eased dismissal 
in about 10% of all establishments, representing about 5% of all employees (Emmerich, 
Walwei, and Zika 1997). The amendment in October 1996 became immediately effective, 
however, only for new hires. Already employed workers were guaranteed the original level of 
protection against dismissal for a transition period of three years. This regulation will make it 
difficult to exactly identify the treatment group of the reform in the empirical analysis. 
Even before the provisions for a gradual transition had expired, the newly appointed center-
left government under Chancellor Schröder tightened dismissal protection legislation, by 
returning to the original threshold value of five employees. Thus, from January 1999, 
establishments employing six to ten employees once more operated under more stringent 
regulations for firings, whereas the growth dynamics of smaller units was possibly affected by 
behavior to avoid becoming subject to the PADA. 
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3.2 Data 
In the empirical analysis, we will use the German exemption policy concerning small businesses, 
and the repeated changes therein, to estimate the effect of dismissal protection legislation on 
employment dynamics of establishments in a neighborhood of the threshold. Our estimates 
are based on a large employer-employee data set specifically constructed for this research on 
the basis of the German Employment Statistics Register. The Employment Statistics 
Register is an administrative, event history panel data set of individuals based on the notifying 
procedure for the German health insurance, statutory pension scheme, and unemployment 
insurance. Employers are obliged to notify the social security agencies about the beginning 
and the termination of any employment relationship of workers covered by social insurance.2 
All workers employed by the same unit can be matched via an establishment identifier. 
Following the history of events recorded for a given establishment, it is possible to calculate 
the stock of employees at any given point in time. In determining establishment size, missing 
workers without a social insurance record could be a source of measurement error. Given that 
regular contracted workers, as those covered by the dismissal protection legislation, as a rule 
are statutory contributors to the social insurance agencies, this issue, however, does not seem 
to be of practical importance. 
¿From this administrative data set, we took 5% random cross-sections representative of West 
German establishments with less than 30 employees at the beginning of March 1995, March 
1997, and March 1999, respectively. The original samples exclude all establishments in the 
highly subsidized agricultural and mining sectors, as well as non-profit firms. We further 
exclude all establishments in the shipping industry and all establishments active in aircraft 
transportation. These sectors are exempted from applicability of the PADA by specific 
legislation. 
We follow employment behavior of sampled establishments in the course of the following 
twelve months. Specifically, we observe all hirings and separations of employees, though we 
cannot distinguish between layoffs and quits. We exclude establishments not providing 
information for the full year as they exit from the panel.3 Survival probabilities are a positive 
function of firm size. The sample available for the empirical analysis therefore contains 
relatively more larger establishments than smaller establishments. Our working sample 
consists of 53,041 establishments with almost 281.0 thousand employees in March 1995, 
                                                
2 See Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) for more detailed information about the Employment Statistics 
Register and the notifying procedure. 
3 Exiting establishments may go out of business, merge with other establishments or divide into new 
legal entities. Since the data does not distinguish between the different reasons, we cannot be sure 
that firms engage in strategic exit and entry behavior. The Constitutional Court has ruled out, 
however, that firms achieve exemption from the PADA by splitting into smaller units. 
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54,355 establishments with almost 289.1 thousand employees in March 1997, and 54,900 
establishments with slightly more than 289.1 thousand employees in March 1999. 
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of our sample together with the timing of the two policy 
changes under study. Timing is an important issue in the context of policy evaluation, because 
statistical identification of policy effects is contaminated if agents have the chance to modify 
their behavior in anticipation of the treatment (the so-called Ashenfelter-dip problem). Our 
first time frame ends seven months before the minimum firm size for exemption from the 
PADA was lifted in October 1996. A review of the political debate preceding this step 
suggests that this period is sufficient to preclude anticipation effects. The discussion about the 
amendment only intensified from April 1996. 
The second time frame starts five months after the change in the threshold value from five to 
ten employees and ends ten months before the reinstatement of the original regulations. We 
acknowledge that the observation window might begin too early for the reform to unfold its 
full labor market effects, especially in view of the arrangements made for a gradual transition. 
A time frame closer to the implementation of the second reform, however, does not seem 
appropriate. This reform played an important role in the Social Democrats’ campaign to win 
the general elections in September 1998, and the landslide win of the center-left bloc was 
easily foreseeable. 
During the time period covered by the third observation window, the reform of January 1999 
was probably generally perceived as being permanent. At least there was no indication that 
the government would soon once more deregulate dismissal protection. Again, the time frame 
is probably too close for the reform effects to fully unfold. However, we cannot work with a 
later sample period due to data limitations. The accessible part of the Employment Statistics 
Register expires at the beginning of 2001. Many notifications for the final months of 2000 are 
missing, probably not at random. 
In summary, the construction of the repeated cross-sectional samples allows us to be confident 
that the empirical analysis of the reform effects will not suffer from the Ashenfelter-dip 
problem. Given the relatively short distance of the observation windows from the 
implementation of the reform, the measured outcome variables, however, might not capture 
the full impact of the changes in dismissal protection legislation on employment dynamics. 
As explained above, the threshold scale for applicability of the PADA is not based on simple 
head count, but on the concept of permanent full-time equivalent employees. We therefore 
need to recalculate establishment size according to the provisions of the law. Specifically, we 
deduct workers coded as being in apprenticeship training from the total number of workers in 
an establishment. Employees coded as working less than full-time are given a weight smaller 
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than unity according the specifications of the PADA. The part-time correction might be a 
source of measurement error, because the hours grid recorded by the Employment Statistics 
Register does not fully coincide with that relevant for the dismissal protection legislation.4  
Another potential source of measurement error is that we cannot observe fixed-term contracts. 
Non-permanent workers who are actually not protected against dismissal count as regular 
employees. This kind of measurement error will not lead to any bias, however, as long as it 
does not systematically vary with firm size or the outcome variable under study. 
The calculation of establishment sizes in line with the provisions of the PADA reduces 
average unit sizes in our sample by about 0.7 employees in all three cross-sections. Figure 2 
displays the distribution of the relevant establishment sizes. One could expect that variable 
enforcement of dismissal protection legislation generates a discontinuity in the neighborhood 
of the exemption threshold values. The unconditional employment stocks, however, do not 
show any obvious discontinuity at the five employees threshold valid in 1995 and 1999, 
respectively the ten employees threshold valid in 1997. 
In line with the theory of dismissal protection, our empirical analysis focuses on worker 
flows. Following the literature on macroeconomic labor market turnover (Burgess, Lane and 
Stevens 2000; Davis and Haltiwanger 1999), we define hirings as the total inflow of 
employees into an establishment during the twelve-months observation windows covered by 
our data. Accordingly, separations are defined as the total outflow of employees from an 
establishment during the different one-year periods. Finally, job flows are defined as the 
difference between hirings and separations. Note that this concept is less informative with 
regard to labor dynamics. The mapping between gross worker flows and the net change in 
employment stocks is not unique. Hiring, separation and job flow rates are obtained by 
dividing the respective worker flows by the initial number of workers in the establishment. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
Several hypotheses how the PADA affects employment dynamics at the establishment level 
follow from the theoretical considerations in Section 2. Focusing on the exemption threshold, 
the behavior of establishments operating below is expected to be different from that of those 
operating above. We expect that the latter show lower hiring and separation rates compared 
with otherwise identical, exempted establishments. Units right above the threshold, however, 
may have an incentive to reduce the level of employment to get below the threshold, whereas 
they could be expected to behave like other firms above the threshold regarding hiring. 
                                                
4 For this reason, we cannot control for the effects of a minor change in the weighting scheme which, 
as part of the 1999 reform, could have brought establishments closer to the exemption threshold 
without actually adjusting employment. 
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Likewise, establishments exactly at or close to the threshold should exhibit lower hiring rates, 
if they are reluctant to grow to avoid passing the threshold. 
Focusing on the impact of the policy changes, a hypothesis to be tested is that the liberalization 
from October 1996 increased hirings in newly exempted firms. The effect on separations is 
probably ambiguous due to the provisions made for a gradual transition. Following the return to 
the original legislation from January 1999, one could expect that hirings and separations 
decreased in establishments coming under more stringent dismissal protection. 
4.1 Unconditional Means 
For a basic check whether behavior of establishments is in line with these hypotheses, we 
analyze unconditional means. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of worker flow rates by 
establishment size category and sample period. As expected, worker turnover tends to 
decrease with establishment size. Very small establishments, however, seem to behave 
differently than larger establishments with regard to separations. Separation rates in 
establishments with less than six employees are consistently smaller than in establishments 
with 6-10 employees. This suggests relatively higher job stability in the former. But this could 
be a statistical artefact considering that the smallest companies possibly rather go out of 
business than fire. 
The results obtained from comparing unconditional mean worker flows by firm size in 
consecutive sample periods (before-after) are generally in line with changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. Economic growth accelerated over the covered period, 
triggering higher worker turnover. In particular, at the peak of the business cycle from 1999-
2000, both hiring rates and separation rates are significantly higher than earlier. This is true 
for all establishment size categories. 
Focusing on the potential effects of the more liberal dismissal protection legislation during the 
period 1997-1998, the descriptive statistics do not indicate that the reform positively affected the 
newly exempted establishments. Compared with the pre-reform period, there is no significant 
increase in hirings and —in contrast to the expectations— even a significant reduction in 
separations from establishments with 6-10 employees. Hiring and separation rates in 
establishments with 6-10 employees increased significantly after the employment threshold was 
reduced once more to five employees from January 1999. Again, this observation does not 
coincide with the theoretical expectations. Note, however, that a similar pattern could be 
observed for all other establishment size categories as well. This may indicate that the change 
in hiring and separation rates between 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 is a result of the business 
cycle. 
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Relying on purely descriptive statistics to conclude that there are no employment effects of 
changes in the thresholds of the PADA may be misleading, because there may be 
countervailing compositional effects that need to be controlled for. Identification of causal 
employment effects triggered by the PADA requires a more refined econometric analysis of 
the data, to which we proceed next. 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Our first empirical strategy closely follows Borgarello, Garibaldi, and Pacelli (2003) in 
attempting to identify the employment effects of dismissal protection legislation by utilizing 
variation along the establishment size dimension alone.5 Specifically, we study the cross-
sectional relationship 
 ,''' itCSitititit ZEXY εδγβ +++=  (1) 
where Yit refers to a measure of employment dynamics in establishment i during the sample 
period t, Xit is a vector of establishment characteristics, and itε  is an i.i.d. normal error term 
with mean zero and variance 2σ . Eit is a vector of variables fitting a parametric relationship 
between the outcome measure and establishment size, whereas Zit is a vector of index 
variables for initial establishment sizes around the threshold. Note that Xit, Eit, and Zit are 
measured at the beginning of sample period t. 
The empirical strategy behind the cross-sectional specification (1) is to identify employment 
effects of exemption threshold legislation via outliers in the outcome variable relative to the 
estimated functional establishment size relationship. The hypothesis of threshold effects can 
be tested via the estimated parameter vector csδ  which should be statistically different from 
zero around the threshold. 
In estimating the cross-sectional relationship (1), we include the employment share of blue 
collar workers, the employment share of females, the employment share of apprentices, the log 
average establishment wage, the mean age of the employees in an establishment and its squared, 
14 industry dummies, and six regional dummies in the vector of establishment characteristics 
Xit. Calculated employment shares are based on the total number of employees in an 
establishment. We use different specifications of the index vector Zit to study heterogeneous 
treatment effects. Employment in the vectors Eit and Zit can take non-integer values, as it is 
measured in terms of full-time equivalent workers according to the PADA. 
                                                
5 A similar approach for Germany investigating threshold effects arising from the Disability 
Protection Act is used by Kölling, Schnabel, and Wagner (2001). 
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In the following, we focus on a selection of results estimated on the cross-sectional data from 
March 1995 to March 1996.6 Columns 1-4 of Table 2 report estimation results for a 
specification only considering the inverse of employment for identification of threshold 
effects via outliers. The baseline specification excluding specific threshold effects (column 1) 
indicates a statistically significant negative relationship between establishment size, i.e. the 
inverse of inverse employment, and job flow and hiring rates. For separation rates, however, 
the results indicate a significant positive relationship with the inverse of employment. An 
explanation for this somewhat unexpected result is that separation rates grow over the bottom 
of the establishment size distribution (see Table 1). This constitutes the estimated 
establishment size effect due to the large proportion of very small establishments in the 
sample. 
Judged against this benchmark model, the estimated parameters for an index variable marking 
the establishment size category exempted from applicability of the PADA (column 2) are 
consistent with the theoretical expectations. Establishments not treated by the stringent 
provisions against dismissal show statistically significant higher hiring and separation rates if 
compared with the population of establishments operating above the exemption threshold value 
of five employees. The index variable does not show, however, a statistically significant effect 
on job flow rates, indicating that the PADA reduces worker flows without changing 
employment stocks. 
Column 3 of Table 2 includes separate index variables for establishments with up to four 
employees and with more than four and up to exactly five employees. This extended 
specification permits to analyze the effects of the PADA on establishments operating exactly 
at the threshold. The estimation results again confirm theoretical expectations. Establishments 
with up to four employees show statistically significant higher hiring and separation rates if 
compared with establishments operating above the exemption threshold. The two effects seem 
to cancel out each other in terms of employment levels. At least the estimated parameter on 
the index variable for this establishment size category is not statistically significant different 
from zero in the job flow equation. Establishments operating exactly at the threshold only 
have statistically significant higher separation rates than establishments not exempted from 
the PADA. This effect further translates into statistically significant lower job flow rates. 
These results support the hypothesis that establishments operating exactly at the threshold are 
reluctant to grow in order to avoid passing the threshold. 
                                                
6 In addition to the estimates reported here, we estimated models for the benchmark functional form 
on establishment size effects including a specification using level of total establishment 
employment and its squared, and a specification using the logarithm of total establishment 
employment and its squared. A complete set of results, including the parallel estimates for the two 
later sample periods, are available from the authors upon request. 
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Column 4 reports the results obtained from a less parsimonious parameterization of the 
treatment dummies, which could control for spill-over effects around the exemption threshold 
value. This specification extends the previous specification shown by including two additional 
index variables for establishments operating just above the threshold. These firms may have 
an incentive to reduce the stock of workers in order to get below the threshold, while 
behaving similar to other firms above the threshold with regard to their hiring decisions. 
Establishments with up to four employees again show significantly higher hiring and 
separation rates compared with the reference group under the provisions of the PADA. The 
finding that establishments exactly operating at the threshold value of five employees exhibit 
significantly larger hiring rates than the reference group, however, seems to contradict the 
prediction that these establishments stop growing in order to avoid the threshold. A possible 
explanation for the statistically significant positive outcome is replacement hires. This 
interpretation is backed by the significantly higher separation rates dominating worker flows 
in this establishment size category. Further supportive evidence comes from the regression on 
job flow rates, which indicates that establishments operating exactly at the threshold have 
statistically significant lower employment growth than do establishments in the reference 
group. 
The estimation results for establishments operating just above the threshold are also in line 
with the theoretical expectations. Whereas their hiring rates are not significantly different 
from those of establishments in the reference group, their separation rates are significantly 
higher. This result supports the hypothesis that they try to reduce the stock of workers in order 
to get below the threshold. However, compared with establishments in the reference group, only 
establishments with seven employees exhibit significantly lower employment growth rates. 
The results for a more flexible parameterization of the benchmark establishment size model 
including the level of employment in addition to inverse employment, are shown in columns 
5-8 of Table 2. Compared with the parallel estimates reported in columns 2-4, the 
establishment size index coefficients are less precisely estimated, leading to statistically 
insignificant threshold effects for the specifications reported in columns 6 and 7. The 
specification permitting different effects both just below and just above the threshold (column 
8), however, is again in line with the theoretical expectations. 
Yet these results are at best tentative evidence for a causal relationship between dismissal 
protection legislation and worker flows. The cross-sectional approach relies on rather strong 
identification assumptions. First, in order to interpret the estimated coefficients csδ  as a causal 
effect of the treatment on the outcome variable, it has to be assumed that the treated 
establishments would have behaved exactly like the reference group, if they had not been 
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treated. This assumption might not hold, for example, because of omitted variable bias, 
unobserved heterogeneity or self-selection into establishment sizes. 
Moreover, the statistical significance of outliers around the threshold crucially depends on the 
specification of the functional relationship between establishment size and employment 
dynamics, but there is no economic model for justifying a specific parametric form. 
Considering that dismissal protection legislation may simultaneously impinge upon the 
establishment size distribution, statistical criteria to select the preferred specification of Eit are 
unreliable as well. The uncertainty about the correct specification of Eit renders estimation 
results using cross-sectional data suspicious. On the one hand, the finding of statistically 
significant threshold effects might be due to misspecification of Eit. On the other hand, by 
including establishment employment polynomials of sufficiently high order in the vector Eit, 
one could force any threshold effects to become statistically insignificant. 
In this regard, our experience with alternative specifications for the parametric relationship 
between establishment size and worker flows is rather disappointing— they do not generate 
robust results. Furthermore, while our estimation results for the sample period 1999-2000 are 
similar to those reported above, no clear-cut pattern of significant threshold effects emerges for 
the sample period 1997-1998 when the exemption threshold value stood at ten employees. 
Overall, it appears that one could generate any level of statistical support for the theoretical 
hypotheses, depending on the theoretically and empirically ambiguous specification of the 
benchmark model. A more flexible higher-dimensional polynomial in employment, capturing 
specific behavior at the bottom of the establishment size distribution unrelated to dismissal 
protection legislation, might wipe away the remaining significant behavioral outliers. In lack 
of a satisfying economic model for unconstrained employment dynamics as a function of 
establishment size, we decide not to move further in this direction. Instead, we proceed to a 
difference-in-differences model, which relies on weaker identification assumptions. 
4.3 Difference-in-differences Results 
The difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator controls for unobserved, time-invariant 
determinants of the outcome variable by taking first differences. Application of this empirical 
strategy requires the availability of both cross-sectional and time-series variation of the 
stimulus under study. In our context, we can use the repeated changes in the threshold scale 
for applicability of the PADA, to gauge the specific impact of dismissal protection legislation 
on worker flows. More formally, we estimate the effect unique to treated establishments after 
treatment, DiDδ , 
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where Yit is an outcome variable observed in establishment i at time t, and Xit a vector of 
characteristics of establishment i at time t. Zit represents a dichotomous variable taking the 
value of unity if an establishment belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise. 
Likewise, Dit is a dichotomous variable taking the value of unity for observations made under 
the state after implementation of the policy change, and zero for observations made under the 
pre-reform state. The straightforward intuition for equation (2) is that the policy effect shows 
up as an excess change of the average outcome in the treatment group, relative to the 
simultaneous change in a control group. A major advantage of this approach is that it will 
difference away the unsettled baseline relationship between establishment size and worker 
flows provided it is constant over time. 
Specifically, the DiD parameter DiDδ  can be obtained from the following basic regression 
model: 
 ,'''' itDiDitititititititit ZDXDDZXY εδψγβ ρ +++++=  (3) 
which can be estimated by simple OLS, though it is necessary to compute robust standard 
errors to account for heteroscedasticity of the random error term itε  across periods and 
groups. In the empirical model (3), the parameter γ  captures the effect of characteristics of 
the treatment group unrelated to the treatment. The parameter ρ  shows the effect of period 
effects unrelated to the policy change. If there remains a group-policy effect, i.e., if DiDδ  is 
significantly different from zero, this can be attributed to the treatment. 
The key identification assumption of the DiD approach, therefore, is that the parameter DiDδ  
equals zero in the absence of the policy change. This implies that the interaction term must be 
uncorrelated with the random model component. Put differently, as the model only includes 
common time effects Dit, it has to be assumed that conditional on Xit, there are no unobserved 
determinants of the outcome variables changing over time which have a differential effect on 
the treatment and control groups. This assumption rules out, for example, that changes in the 
macroeconomic environment display different effects on the two groups. 
Figure 3 presents insolvency frequencies by firm size together with GDP growth over the 
sample period. Clearly, the insolvency pattern of firms with 6-10 employees (approximately 
the treatment group of the policy changes) resembles that of larger firms (the control group). 
This observation may support the claim that the employment response to macroeconomic 
shocks is similar among these groups of firms. In contrast, it does not appear that the 
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economic cycle affects firms with less than six employees in the same way as the control 
group. If this were true, the estimated parameter DiDδ  for this establishment category could 
capture size-specific variation in outcomes due to macroeconomic shocks, rather than the 
effects of changes in dismissal protection legislation. This concern seems less relevant when 
studying the central treatment group of establishments with 6-10 employees. 
In implementing the DiD estimator, we combine the repeated cross-sections to create two 
unbalanced panels. Specifically, we analyze a panel including the observations for periods 
March 1995-March 1996 and March 1997-March 1998 (panel A), covering the first reform 
raising the exemption threshold scale to ten employees, and a panel including the observations 
for periods March 1997-March 1998 and March 1999-March 2000 (panel B), covering the 
second reform reinstating the original legislation. In all estimations, the vector Xit includes the 
same set of establishment characteristics as for the cross-sectional approach. We allow that the 
parameters on these observables vary over time. 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating a baseline specification of the DiD-model using 
establishments with 21 to 30 employees as the control group. By specifying a vector of 
treatment group indicators, we allow for multiple treatment groups. While we expect that the 
reforms change behavior in establishments with 0-5 and 6-10 employees, they should not 
affect establishments with 11-20 employees. The latter are only included for a specification 
check. 
The estimates reported in Table 3 indicate that in this establishment size category worker flows 
following the policy changes were indeed not statistically different from those in the control 
group. The same applies, however, to the establishments potentially affected by the reform. In 
fact, none of the estimated coefficients for the treatment groups is statistically significant at 
any reasonable level. Hence there is no support for the hypothesis that more stringent 
dismissal protection legislation has a detrimental impact on worker turnover. 
To check the robustness of this unexpectedly indistinct result, we investigate alternatives to 
the baseline specification. The previous specification could blur effects occurring just in the 
neighborhood of the exemption threshold. We therefore estimate an extended specification 
using a more detailed classification of establishment size categories. The results, reported in 
Table 4, do not point at the existence of specific threshold effects, which could support the 
hypothesis of a negative relationship between the stringency of dismissal protection 
legislation and worker flows. Again, none of the estimated DiD parameters is statistically 
different from zero. 
Given the rather complicated concept of calculating the establishment size relevant for 
application of the PADA, another issue to be explored is potential optimization error on the 
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side of employers. However, estimating the same model as that on display in Table 4 but using a 
simple head count (including apprentices) rather than the number of full-time equivalent 
workers, does not generate any qualitatively different results.7 
Our results also might be sensitive toward the choice of the control group. Table 5 reports 
estimation results for the extended model of multiple treatment groups, using the change in 
behavior of establishments with 16-20 employees as a benchmark. This alternative 
specification does not change the qualitative outcome. Unexpectedly, the estimation on panel 
B indicates a highly significant reduction in hiring and job flow rates for establishments with 
11 employees. It is difficult to argue that the January 1999 reform could have changed 
behavior of these establishments in this direction. This result rather seems to suggest that the 
model specification does not manage to correct for all shocks with a differential impact on the 
control group and the establishments in this size category. 
Finally, our indistinct results might be due to heterogenous treatment effects. Given the 
construction of our sample, it is clear that the estimated DiD parameters only measure the 
short-run effects of the changes in dismissal protection legislation. The strength of these 
effects, however, could vary across establishments depending on the economic value put on 
stability of employment relationships. Following Alvarez and Veracierto (1998), one might 
hypothesize that deregulation of dismissal protection legislation has a stronger short-term 
influence on establishments facing comparatively more volatile demand. Arguing that demand 
is on average less volatile in manufacturing than in services where employment relationships 
are relatively shorter and firms rely on comparatively little specific human capital, one might 
test this hypothesis by comparing policy responses in these sectors. Table 6 reports the results 
for the extended treatment group specification (using establishments of size 21-30 as control 
group) estimated on separate panels for the manufacturing and service sector. 
The results do not support the interpretation that our insignificant outcomes are due to 
heterogeneous treatment effects. In neither sector, worker flows significantly respond to the 
policy treatment. The only exception are establishments located at the exemption threshold 
value prior to the October 1996 reform (see panel A). The significant effect appears on 
separation rates, however, while the theoretical expectation for this treatment group is that 
deregulation facilitates hirings. Likewise, it is difficult to explain the opposite signs of the 
DiD parameters. In detail, the point estimates for the manufacturing and service sectors, 
though generally insignificant, actually differ quite substantially. For example, the consistent 
pattern of lower separation rates in establishments with 6-10 workers despite deregulation of 
the PADA (compare panel A in Table 6 and previous tables) seems mainly attributable to the 
service sector. Following the argument that the provisions for a gradual transition change the 
                                                
7 The results of this specification are available from the authors upon request. 
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volume of quits, this observation is in line with the hypothesis that the economic value of 
staying under protection against dismissal is higher in the service sector where firings are 
more frequent. Further investigation into differential sector effects, therefore, might be a 
worthwhile undertaking, but goes beyond the scope of the present paper. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the effects of variable enforcement of dismissal protection legislation 
on worker flows in small establishments, focusing on the German institutional setting. 
Empirical estimates based on cross sections drawn from a large employer-employee matched 
panel data set provide some significant evidence that worker turnover rates are lower in 
establishments under the provisions for protection against dismissal than establishments 
exempted from the legislation by application of a threshold scale. This empirical result, 
however, relies on strong identification assumptions, and is not satisfactorily robust over 
plausible specifications of the underlying empirical model. 
Alternatively, we used a difference-in-differences approach demanding weaker identification 
assumptions. We exploit time-series variation from two recent labor market reforms changing 
the minimum establishment firm size for applicability of the Protection against Dismissal Act. 
The estimation results do not suggest any significant relationship between the stringency of 
dismissal protection legislation and worker turnover. Several specification checks confirmed 
this finding as robust. As the sample construction makes us confident that the DiD estimates do 
not suffer from anticipation effects, the question is what factors explain the discrepancy 
between the empirical facts and economic theory, which unambiguously predicts a detrimental 
effect of dismissal protection legislation on hirings and firings? 
An obvious explanation is that measurement of outcomes is not sufficiently distant from the 
implementation of the policy reforms. But even if behavioral adjustment were sluggish, one 
would expect to observe significant effects considering the large size of our samples. A more 
plausible explanation is that dismissal taxes effectively are small in spite of the seemingly 
high hurdles to dismissal imposed by German legislation. First, the impact of voluntary quits 
can substantially reduce the average dismissal cost per separation. Nickell and Layard (1999) 
show that if the volume of voluntary quits is sufficiently large, this effect might in theory 
fully offset the incentive effects of dismissal protection legislation, though in practice this 
extreme case is unlikely to occur. 
A second factor possibly reducing dismissal taxes is exploitation of unconstrained 
employment buffers. Most importantly, establishments could expand or contract employment 
along the hours margin. In fact, variation of working hours appears to be strong in Germany 
compared with countries with less stringent dismissal protection legislation. Moreover, as the 
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legal provisions only apply to workers with regular contracts, employers might respond by 
adjusting employment at the relatively more flexible contractual margin, i.e. through fixed-
term workers or apprentices. A third example of a potential structural effect of dismissal 
protection which would not be detected by our empirical analysis, is changes in the quality of 
hirings and separations. Firms might reduce the expected value of dismissal tax payment by 
establishing better job matches. If this is the case, the amount of hiring, for example, might 
not change, whereas the composition shifts toward more productive employees earning higher 
wages. 
Clearly, although the paper provides convincing evidence that dismissal protection legislation 
in the German institutional setting does not have substantial effects on worker flows and 
employment levels in small establishments, the results are not sufficient to claim that 
constraints on dismissals do not matter at all. On the one hand, we do not know how 
inflexibility with regard to firings affects small establishments that go out of business, or, 
more fundamentally, are not established because of expected firings costs. On the other hand, 
we do not know how larger establishments behaved in the presence of less stringent dismissal 
protection legislation. Therefore, qualified policy recommendations require further research 
with disaggregated firm level data. 
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Figure 1: Sample Construction 
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Figure 2: Frequency of Establishment Sizes 
 
Note: Establishment sizes calculated according to provisions of German Protection against Dismissal Act. 
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Figure 3: GDP Growth and Bankruptcies by Firm Size 
 
Source: Statistics Germany, Creditreform. 
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Table 1: Worker Flow Rates by Establishment Size 
  1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000
   Firm Size 0-5   Firm Size 6-10  
HR Mean 46.177 49.976 55.273 37.611 36.764 42.196 
 S.D. (1.016) (1.425) (0.815) (1.835) (0.587) (0.623) 
 Before-After  -3.799† -5.297†  -0.847 -5.432† 
SR Mean 34.623 35.496 39.520 39.182 37.231 41.606 
 S.D. (0.427) (0.435) (0.432) (0.478) (0.427) (0.461) 
 Before-After  -0.872 -4.025†  1.951† -4.375† 
JFR Mean 11.553 14.480 15.752 -1.570 -0.467 0.590 
 S.D. (0.867) (1.174) (0.578) (1.777) (0.451) (0..067) 
 Before-After  -2.926† -1.272  -1.104 -1.057 
   Firm Size 11-
20 
  Firm Size > 20  
HR Mean 32.926 35.039 40.704 33.558 32.365 38.111 
 S.D. (0.568) (0.687) (0.912) (0.987) (0.980) (1.171) 
 Before-After  -2.112† -5.665†  1.194 -5.746† 
SR Mean 35.828 35.649 40.168 35.201 33.946 37.527 
 S.D. (0.490) (0.540) (0.598) (0.898) (0.868) (0.859) 
 Before-After  0.178 -4.520†  1.255 -3.581† 
JFR Mean -2.902 -0.610 0.535 -1.642 -1.581 0.584 
 S.D. (0.416) (0.440) (0.562) (0.721) (0.685) (0.842) 
 Before-After  -2.291† -1.145  -0.061 -2.165† 
 
Notes: † indicates significance at the 95% confidence level. JFR: Job Flow Rate; HR: Hiring Rate;  
SR: Separation Rate. Before-After: comparison of means in sampling period with means in  
preceding sampling period. 
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Table 2: Cross-Section Results, 1995-1996 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Variable: Hiring Rates 
0-4   0.062† 0.081†   0.026 0.049† 
   (0.015) (0.013)   (0.023) (0.014) 
0-5  0.051†    0.013   
  (0.013)    (0.022)   
5   0.008 0.025†   -0.020 -0.001 
   (0.013) (0.010)   (0.020) (0.014) 
6    0.077    0.054 
    (0.052)    (0.053) 
7    0.018    -0.003 
    (0.011)    (0.013) 
Employment-1 0.284† 0.257† 0.245† 0.244† 0.244† 0.243† 0.233† 0.236† 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Employment     -0.006† -0.005† -0.005† -0.003† 
     (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
 Dependent Variable: Separation Rates 
0-4   0.053† 0.066†   0.031† 0.050† 
   (0.007) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.010) 
0-5  0.048†    0.026†   
  (0.006)    (0.007)   
5   0.031† 0.044†   0.014 0.031† 
   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.010) 
6    0.039†    0.027† 
    (0.008)    (0.010) 
7    0.040†    0.029† 
    (0.010)    (0.011) 
Employment-1 -0.106† -0.131† -0.136† -0.137† -0.137† -0.140† -0.144† -0.141† 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Employment     -0.005† -0.003† -0.003† -0.002† 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Dependent Variable: Job Flow Rates 
0-4   0.010 0.014   -0.004 -0.001 
   (0.012) (0.009)   (0.022) (0.010) 
0-5  0.003    -0.013   
  (0.011)    (0.021)   
5   -0.023† -0.019†   -0.034 -0.032† 
   (0.011) (0.007)   (0.019) (0.009) 
6    0.039    0.027 
    (0.051)    (0.052) 
7    -0.021†    -0.032† 
    (0.008)    (0.009) 
Employment-1 0.390† 0.389† 0.381† 0.381† 0.381† 0.383† 0.377† 0.377† 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Employment     -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Notes: Results from OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 53,041 observations. † indicates significance 
at the 95% confidence level. All regressions include the following control variables: share of blue 
collar workers, share of females, share of apprentices, log average wage, mean age of employees, mean 
age of employees squared, 14 industry dummies, and six regional dummies. 
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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Results: Basic Specification 
Panel A: 1995–1997 Panel B: 1997–1999 Establish- 
ment Size HR SR JFR HR SR JFR 
0-5 -1.822 -0.826 -0.996 2.107 -0.302 2.409 
 (3.873) (1.504) (3.297) (3.651) (1.436) (3.054) 
6-10 -2.409 -1.623 -0.786 0.907 0.460 0.447 
 (2.642) (1.346) (2.301) (2.096) (1.335) (1.618) 
11-20 1.622 0.545 1.076 1.038 1.207 -0.170 
 (1.714) (1.360) (1.228) (1.911) (1.392) (1.349) 
 
Notes: Results from OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: Establishment  
Size 21-30. Observations 1995-1997: 107,396. Observations 1997-1999: 109,255. † indicates 
significance at the 95% confidence level. All regressions include the following control variables 
and interactions of these variables with an index variable for year 1997 respectively 1999: share 
of blue collar workers, share of females, share of apprentices, log average wage, mean age of  
employees, mean age of employees squared, 14 industry dummies, and six regional dummies.  
JFR:  Job Flow Rate; HR:  Hiring Rate; SR:  Separation Rate. 
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Results: Extended Specification 
Panel A: 1995–1997 Panel B: 1997–1999 Establish- 
ment Size HR SR JFR HR SR JFR 
0-4 -2.582 -1.090 -1.492 2.749 -0.109 2.858 
 (4.104) (1.541) (3.523) (3.839) (1.461) (3.239) 
5 2.861 0.807 2.053 -2.581 -1.416 -1.165 
 (4.358) (1.976) (3.094) (4.413) (1.978) (3.126) 
6 -7.104 -1.886 -5.218 2.785 1.095 1.691 
 (5.715) (1.594) (5.489) (2.702) (1.662) (2.100) 
7-9 -0.626 -1.420 0.793 -0.295 -0.394 0.099 
 (2.118) (1.452) (1.598) (2.122) (1.411) (1.614) 
10 1.130 -2.185 3.315 2.163 3.186 -1.023 
 (3.122) (2.007) (2.560) (3.334) (2.049) (2.610) 
11 2.467 1.217 1.250 -3.550 -0.029 -3.521 
 (2.839) (2.214) (1.938) (2.716) (2.100) (1.967) 
12-15 1.339 0.272 1.066 1.335 1.784 -0.449 
 (1.862) (1.493) (1.346) (2.066) (1.556) (1.455) 
16-20 1.617 0.558 1.060 2.933 0.983 1.949 
 (2.169) (1.679) (1.491) (2.815) (1.848) (1.808) 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Results: Alternative Control Group 
Panel A: 1995–1997 Panel B: 1997–1999 Establish- 
ment Size HR SR JFR HR SR JFR 
0-4 -4.252 -1.670 -2.582 -0.144 -1.071 0.927 
 (3.889) (1.571) (3.237) (3.988) (1.685) (3.096) 
5 1.218 0.237 0.982 -5.506 -2.388 -3.119 
 (4.311) (1.997) (2.974) (4.657) (2.144) (3.124) 
6 -8.754 -2.464 -6.290 -0.148 0.112 -0.260 
 (5.655) (1.621) (5.392) (3.112) (1.858) (2.127) 
7-9 -2.250 -1.982 -0.268 -3.246 -1.383 -1.863 
 (2.136) (1.484) (1.484) (2.687) (1.643) (1.718) 
10 -0.507 -2.762 2.255 -0.793 2.211 -3.004 
 (3.150) (2.033) (2.507) (3.735) (2.218) (2.693) 
11 0.859 0.669 0.190 -6.496† -1.028 -5.468† 
 (2.907) (2.237) (1.914) (3.223) (2.269) (2.096) 
12-15 -0.295 -0.303 0.008 -1.620 0.799 -2.419 
 (1.995) (1.528) (1.348) (2.736) (1.777) (1.685) 
 
Notes: Results from OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: Establishment Size 16-20. 
Observations 1995-1997: 104,616 . Observations 1997-1999: 106,481. See also notes to Table 3. 
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Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Results by Industry 
HR SR JFR Establish- 
ment Size Manuf. Serv. Manuf. Serv. Manuf. Serv. 
   Panel A: 1995 - 1997   
0-4 -8.787 1.134 0.250 -2.064 -9.037 3.198 
 (6.178) (5.110) (2.638) (1.915) (5.559) (4.250) 
5 1.160 4.313 5.941† -2.195 -4.781 6.508 
 (3.668) (6.343) (2.826) (2.631) (2.672) (4.459) 
6 -4.804 -7.547 -0.812 -2.837 -3.993 -4.710 
 (3.508) (8.562) (2.811) (1.930) (2.578) (8.295) 
7-9 -3.439 0.894 -0.658 -2.224 -2.780 3.119 
 (3.469) (2.715) (2.468) (1.774) (2.668) (2.038) 
10 3.209 -0.339 0.523 -4.042 2.686 3.703 
 (4.704) (4.161) (3.107) (2.595) (3.920) (3.409) 
11 -2.686 4.151 0.086 1.031 -2.773 3.121 
 (4.468) (3.735) (3.737) (2.637) (2.979) (2.643) 
12-15 -0.406 1.023 0.923 -0.706 -1.330 1.729 
 (3.011) (2.484) (2.320) (1.928) (2.418) (1.719) 
16-20 -0.369 1.935 1.454 -0.688 -1.823 2.623 
 (2.997) (3.075) (2.394) (2.293) (2.380) (1.954) 
Obs. 31,215 76,181 31,215 76,181 31,215 76,181 
   Panel B: 1997 - 1999  
0-4 5.525 1.033 2.004 -0.909 3.522 1.942 
 (4.404) (5.201) (2.312) (1.902) (3.608) (4.380) 
5 1.732 -5.018 -2.841 -0.831 4.572 -4.188 
 (3.860) (6.446) (2.637) (2.700) (2.894) (4.539) 
6 7.108 0.396 3.793 -0.282 3.315 0.678 
 (3.839) (3.659) (2.729) (2.116) (2.790) (2.894) 
7-9 2.966 -2.454 0.722 -1.099 2.244 -1.355 
 (3.052) (2.871) (2.199) (1.843) (2.341) (2.164) 
10 -0.086 2.457 2.336 2.881 -2.422 -0.424 
 (4.693) (4.515) (2.966) (2.724) (3.778) (3.514) 
11 0.214 -5.302 1.548 -0.551 -1.335 -4.750 
 (3.918) (3.693) (3.168) (2.772) (2.746) (2.716) 
12-15 2.284 0.839 2.114 1.550 0.170 -0.711 
 (2.738) (2.911) (2.175) (2.140) (2.039) (1.999) 
16-20 9.931† -1.585 4.698 -1.365 5.233 -0.220 
 (5.059) (3.269) (2.986) (2.339) (3.135) (2.186) 
Obs. 31088 78167 31088 78167 31088 78167 
Notes:  See notes to Table 3. 
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